Let There Be Flight: It\u27s Time to Reform the Regulation of Commercial Space Travel by Ryabinkin, Charity Trelease
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 69 | Issue 1 Article 5
2004
Let There Be Flight: It's Time to Reform the
Regulation of Commercial Space Travel
Charity Trelease Ryabinkin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Let There Be Flight: It's Time to Reform the Regulation of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. Air L. & Com. 101
(2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol69/iss1/5
LET THERE BE FLIGHT:
IT'S TIME TO REFORM THE REGULATION OF
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL
CHARITY TRELEASE RYABINKIN*
I. AND WE HAVE LIFl-OFF: THE BIRTH OF
AVIATIO N ......................................... 103
A. AVIATION REGULATION & THE WARSAW
CONVENTION: A FORGIVING REGIME ............. 103
B. LESSONS FOR SPACE TRAVEL REGULATION ....... 106
II. SPACE TOURISM & RLVS: IT'S TIME TO
BOLDLY GET GOING ALREADY ................. 107
A. THE POTENTIAL OF SPACE TOURISM ............. 107
B. SPACE TOURISM & RLVs: COSMIC SYMBIOSIS .... 109
C. OTHER ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR RLV
DEVELOPMENT .................................. 111
III. DEVELOPMENT OF RLV TECHNOLOGY ........ 113
A. GOVERNMENT RLV DEVELOPMENT: A BUMPY RIDE
So FAR ......................................... 113
B. THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE RLV DEVELOPMENT.. 114
IV. CHALLENGES TO RLV DEVELOPMENT &
SPACE TOURISM ................................... 116
A. CHALLENGE NUMBER ONE: PUBLIC
PERCEPTION ....................... * ............. 116
B. CHALLENGE NUMBER Two: INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION OBLIGATIONS ................... 118
C. CHALLENGE NUMBER THREE: RLV REGULATORY
REGIM E ......................................... 119
V. RLV REGULATORY REGIME ...................... 119
A. LIABILITY AND INDEMNIFICATION ................ 119
B. EVOLUTION OF RLV-SPECIFIC LICENSING
REGULATION .................................... 120
* J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, May 2004. This note was
prepared for the Space Law Seminar taught by Paul B. Larsen. The author
extends her deep appreciation to Professor Larsen, Jim Dunstan, and Esta
Rosenberg for their guidance and encouragement.
102 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [69
C. FAA/AST FINAL RULE: RLV LAUNCH AND
REENTRY LICENSING ................................ 122
1. Covered Activities and Types of Licenses ....... 122
2. Licensing and Approval Process ............... 123
i. Policy Approval ........................ 124
ii. Safety Approval ........................ 125
iii. Payload Reentry Review ................ 126
iv. Environmental Review ................. 127
v. Post-Licensing Obligations of RLV
O perators .............................. 127
3. Unique Safety Concerns of RLVs & Risk
L evels ....................................... 128
VI. REFORM & IMPROVEMENT: CURRENT AND
FUTURE MEASURES .............................. 130
A. FAA/AST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RLV
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT ....................... 130
1. COM STAC .................................. 130
2. RLV Mission License Application Workshop ... 131
3. Reports & Studies ........................... 133
B. THE CASE FOR DEREGULATION .................... 133
C. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT INDEMNIFICATION AND
RISK ALLOCATION .................................. 135
D. SIMPLIFY THE RLV LICENSING PROCESS .......... 136
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................... 137
INTRODUCTION
"The old way of doing things got Aldrin into space. It will take a
whole new way to get everyone else there."1
S PACE TRAVEL has a distinctly far-out ring to it. A staple of
science fiction and Star Trek conventions, the concept seems
out of place as the topic of a serious law review article. But con-
trary to popular belief, commercial space travel has the poten-
tial to be as down-to-earth as the daily commute. Within the last
five years, important steps have been taken in realizing this po-
tential. Most notably, the world's first two private space tourists
secured a ride into orbit. While most people would be unwilling
to shell out $20 million dollars for a visit to space, many would
be inclined to buy a less expensive ticket. In fact, market re-
search reveals a desire to visit space among the majority of peo-
ple in the U.S., Canada and Japan. Other studies suggest space
Jeffrey Kluger, Vacations in Orbit, TIME, Sept. 28, 1998.
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travel could blossom into a $10 to $20 billion dollar-a-year
industry.
Crucial to the success of the space travel industry is the devel-
opment of reusable launch vehicle technology. Reusable launch
vehicles (RLVs) represent a more efficient alternative to the ex-
pendable launch vehicles currently used to deliver payloads into
space. According to some estimates, RLVs could reduce space
launch costs from $10,000 per pound to $1,000 per pound.2 In
addition to laying the foundation for a successful space travel
industry, the development of RLV technology carries countless
other benefits. These benefits include reducing the cost of com-
munication and increasing U.S. market share in the commercial
space launches sector.
More than a dozen companies worldwide have begun work on
RLV technology. However, these initiatives have yet to come to
fruition. At publication, not a single RLV company had applied
for a launch license in the United States. Likewise, non-U.S.
companies continue to struggle with realizing this new technol-
ogy. Impediments to RLV development include a lack of public
acceptance of, and support for, space travel along with a cum-
bersome, costly, and unsupportive regulatory regime. Although
great strides have been made in curbing public resistance to
space travel and improving the regulatory framework, more re-
mains to be done.
This note discusses the potential for a commercial space travel
industry and advocates changes to the existing regulatory frame-
work. Part I begins with a history of aviation regulation. Part II
describes the emergence of space tourism and the potential it
holds. Part III discusses government and private development
of RLV technology. Part IV examines general challenges to RLV
development and space tourism. Part V assesses the interna-
tional and domestic regulatory regime surrounding space travel
and RLVs. Part VI concludes with recommendations for reform.
I. AND WE HAVE LIFT-OFF: THE BIRTH OF AVIATION
A. AVIATION REGULATION & THE WARSAW CONVENTION:
A FORGIVING REGIME
The accommodating regulatory regime surrounding the avia-
tion industry provides a useful framework within which to assess
2 Roscoe M. Moore, Risk Analysis and the Regulation of Reusable Launch Vehicles,
64J. AIR L. & COM. 245, 251 (1998).
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the regulation of space travel and RLVs. In particular, the for-
ward-looking Warsaw Convention and a lack of domestic regula-
tory interference facilitated the aviation industry's growth. An
analysis of these factors is helpful in understanding the short-
comings of the regulations governing space travel and RLVs,
and determining what reforms should be made.
Humans' first attempts at flight were hardly graceful. Lacking
the wings and feathers of the animal kingdom's more loftily
equipped creatures, we resorted to clumsy contraptions to reach
the heavens. Often these devices produced unpleasant results -
early film reels document crash after crash after crash. Hind-
sight brings into focus one inescapable conclusion: humans may
not be smart, but they sure have guts.
Undeterred by these failures, humans ultimately persevered:
in 1903, the Wright Brothers flew the first airplane at Kitty
Hawk.4 By 1918, air mail flights were well established.5 Regu-
larly scheduled commercial passenger service began the follow-
ing year.' The early days of commercial air travel, however, were
not without setbacks. Planes were falling out of the sky on a
regular basis, with aircraft fatality rates that would translate into
more than 250,000 deaths per year in modern times.7
Despite the hazards posed by early air travel - or perhaps be-
cause of them - representatives of the world's developed nations
gathered in 1929 to develop a forward-looking international avi-
ation regime. Recognizing the need to shield the fledgling air-
line industry from cost-prohibitive insurance premiums and
unlimited liability for accidents, these nations signed the War-
saw Convention. The result was a radical convention that, for
international flights, rejected strict liability in favor of a negli-
3 See AERONAUTICAL ODDITIES (NASA 1979), at http://www.endeavours.org/
sec/teachers/nasavideo.htm.
4 Amy K. Bock, Comment, How to Restore the Airline Industry to Its Full Upright
Position: An Analysis of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong, Competitive Airline
Industry Report, 59J. AIR L. & CoM. 663 (1994).
5 James E. Dunstan, Is Launching a Rocket Still an Ultra-Hazardous Activity? To-
ward a Negligence Theory for Launch Activities, 9 SPACE MANUFACTURING THE HIGH
FRONTIER: ACCESSION, DEVELOPMENT & UTILIZATION 226, 228 (1993).
6 Id. at 229.
7 Id. The death rate in 1929 was 45 fatalities per million miles flown. Based on
the number of miles flown today, this rate would translate into more than
250,000 deaths per year in aircraft accidents. In reality, fewer than 1,000 people
perish each year in aircraft accidents. In 2002, 702 people died in commercial
aircraft accidents. Boeing Com. Airplane, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Air-
plane Accidents, Worldwide Operations 1959-2002 (2003), at http://www.boeing.
com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf.
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gence standard and capped maximum damages an individual
could collect from an air accident at $10,000.8 Domestically,
early regulation of airline carriers was contingent upon their
participation in the U.S. airmail system - commercial airlines
remained unregulated until 1938.'
Fortunately for the jetsetters among us, the Warsaw Conven-
tion and initial lack of domestic regulation provided the U.S.
airline industry with the combination of protection and free-
dom it needed to flourish.' 0 Today, commercial air travel is an
enormous and growing industry. In the U.S., passenger traffic
exceeds 650 million enplanements per year, up from 300 mil-
lion per year in the early 1980s.11 Globally, more than 3 trillion
passengers travel each year.12 More important, air travel has be-
come the safest form of transportation available: in 2002, only
702 people died in commercial airplane accidents,1" and be-
8 Dunstan, supra note 5, at 229. At the Montreal Convention in 1966, the
United States demanded that the standard be changed to strict liability. Al-
though strict liability applies in the United States and in the other countries that
signed the Montreal Agreement, many nations did not sign this Convention and
are still bound by the Warsaw Convention's negligence standard. Id. The dam-
age cap was retained under the Montreal Convention at $75,000.
9 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1938), was the first statu-
tory source of airline regulation for commercial airlines. JamesJ. McDonald, Air-
line Management Prerogative in the Deregulation Era, 52 J. Air L. & Com. 869, 922
(1987). Airlines with government contracts to carry the mail were regulated by
the Air Mail Act of 1934, 39 U.S.C. § 5401 et seq., but this law served primarily to
prohibit anticompetitive behavior. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Sherman Act's
First Century: A Historical Perspective Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncer-
tain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105,
1117 (1989) (citing Air Mail Act of 1934 as one of several regulatory attempts to
fight "corporate gigantism").
10 Dunstan, supra note 5, at 229.
11 Gerald L. Baliles, Aircraft Noise: Removing a Barrier to Aviation Growth, 66J. AiR
L. & CoM. 1333 (2001). In 1982, the number of enplanements in the U.S. was
309 million. See The Airport System, available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/-ota/disk3/1984/8403/840303.PDF (last visited Jan. 22,
2004).
12 Airports Council International, Passenger Traffic Statistics, at http://www.air
ports.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
13 Boeing Com. Airplane, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents,
Worldwide Operations 1959-2002 (2003), at http://www.boeing.com/news/techis-
sues/pdf/statsum.pdf. The accident statistics presented in this document apply
to worldwide commercial jet airplanes that are heavier than 60,000 pounds maxi-
mum gross weight, not including airplanes manufactured in the Commonwealth
of Independent States or commercial airplanes operated in military service. Be-
tween 1959 and 2002, there were 1,337 accidents worldwide out of a total of 412
million departures, amounting to a fatality rate of far less than 1 percent. Com-
pare this number with the approximately 40,000 people who die in automobile
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tween 1994 and 1998, that number averaged 169 per year. 14 Ac-
cording to a recent Department of Transportation study, only 1
in 1.6 million passengers die in plane crashes, compared with 1
in 6,800 drivers in auto accidents and 1 in 242,000 in train
wrecks. 15
B. LESSONS FOR SPACE TRAVEL REGULATION
The story of man's first foray into the skies-and the accom-
modating regulatory framework that kept him in the air-is in-
structive in the context of space travel. Like air travel in the
early 1900s, space travel represents uncharted territory for the
average modern passenger. The thought of cruising into lower
earth orbit for an afternoon probably seems as far-fetched today
as the idea of keeping a 435-ton16 hunk of metal aloft long
enough to traverse the Atlantic Ocean. Adding to the public's
skepticism is its fear. If the Challenger disaster soured the na-
tion's palate for the Space Shuttle program, the more recent
Columbia explosion sounded the program's death knell. These
two incidents-however isolated-cemented the perception of
many that commercial space travel is too dangerous to pursue.17
The regulatory framework surrounding RLV licensing reflects
this cautious and conservative attitude toward space travel. In
contrast to other international transport industries, which are
governed largely by commercial law, existing space law com-
prises inter-governmental treaties negotiated during the Cold
War.'" The lack of commercial influence on the regulatory
framework for space transport has had some costly ramifica-
accidents and 1,096 in railway accidents each year. See U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, A Comparison of Risk, Accidental Deaths - United States - 1994-1998, at
http://hazmat.dot.gov/riskcompare.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 A Boeing 747 can weigh over 870,000 pounds. See Marshall Brain & Brian
Adkins, How Airplanes Work, at http://travel.howstuffworks.com/airplanel.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
17 See Dunstan, supra note 5, at 232 (noting the tendency of some to deify
Christa McAuliffe and advocating for a negligence standard in space travel); see
also Federal Aviation Administration, About Commercial Space Transportation, at
http://ast.faa.gov/aboutcst/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) (noting that commercial
payloads aboard the Shuttle were banned after the Challenger disaster).
18 Patrick Collins, The Regulatory Reform Agenda for the Era of Passenger Space
Transportation, 20 I.S.T.S. PROC., Paper No. 956-f-13 (1993), available at http://




tions. To begin, space travel is subject to strict liability, 9 while
the airline industry is governed by a negligence standard. One
consequence is that launchers must purchase liability insurance.
In the U.S., the Commercial Space Launch Act of 198420 re-
quires parties who launch space vehicles to purchase $500 mil-
lion in third-party liability insurance. 21 In addition to an
onerous liability regime, commercial space travel is impeded by
sometimes Byzantine domestic licensing procedures. Under
current Federal Administration Aviation (FAA) regulations, any
party wishing to launch an RLV must comply with multiple and
time-consuming requirements, including among others: (1) pol-
icy approval; (2) safety approval; (3) payload and payload reen-
try approval; (4) environmental approval; and (5) ongoing
reporting obligations throughout the term of the license. 22
While a conservative approach to commercial space travel is
not unreasonable, the current regulatory regime places undue
burdens on the industry. The realistic and accommodating reg-
ulatory regime embodied by the Warsaw Convention was crucial
to the growth of the aviation industry.23 Public perception must
be changed and RLV regulation reformed to resemble the avia-
tion regime if the commercial space travel industry is to prosper.
II. SPACE TOURISM & RLVS: IT'S TIME TO BOLDLY
GET GOING ALREADY
A. THE POTENTIAL OF SPACE TOuRiSM
The age of aviation opened up the world and created an in-
dustry with huge economic rewards. Space tourism has similar
19 The international treaties governing the law of outer space impose strict
liability on entities engaged in commercial space transport. See Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, art. 6, T.I.A.S. 6347 [hereinafter 1967 Outer Space
Treaty] (requiring states to bear international responsibility for national activities
in outer space "whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies
or non-governmental entities"); Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects, Sept. 1, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, art. 2, T.I.A.S. 7762
[hereinafter Liability Convention] (making states absolutely liable for damage
caused by their space objects on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight).
20 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-301 (2001).
21 Id. § 70112. The government will cover excess damages up to $1.5 billion,
but the launch company is liable for any amount beyond the $2 billion total. Id.
22 Joshua Izenberg, Regulation of Launch Vehicle Reentry in the United States, at 4
(2001) (unpublished article, on file with author) (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 431.5,
431.7, 431.23, 431.31, 431.33, 431.35, 431.51, 431.53, 431.55, 431.71, 431.79,
431.91, 431.93).
23 Dunstan, supra note 5, at 229.
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potential. Tourism is arguably the world's largest industry,2 4
with global spending on travel estimated to have surpassed $4.3
trillion in 2000.25 In the U.S., the travel and tourism industry is
a $584 billion business, representing 2.2 percent of the nation's
GDP in 1999.26 Tourism in space is simply the next logical ex-
tension of a well-established and profitable industry. As stated
by Buzz Aldrin in a recent article, "Space tourism is based upon
a firm commercial foundation, being a natural evolutionary out-
growth of the booming multi-billion-dollar adventure travel sec-
tor of the multitrillion-dollar travel and tourism business. 27
Some estimate that space tourism could eventually generate
from $10 billion to $20 billion per year.21 Market research dem-
onstrates that space tourism is a popular aspiration of the major-
ity of the population in rich countries, 29 and a recent NASA
survey confirms the huge potential market for space tourism.'o
The current popularity of other space-related tourist activities
heralds this potential. 1 More than ten million people each year
visit space museums, space camps, rocket launch-recovery sites,
and government space research and development centers, gen-
erating approximately $1 billion in revenue per year. 2
Recent developments in space tourism reflect this growing in-
terest. Demonstrating-or perhaps contributing to-public
24 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Law of Intermodal Transportation: What It Was,
What It Is, What It Should Be, 27 TsRAsP. LJ. 367, 413 (2000); see also Alexander C.
O'Neill, What Globalization Means for Ecotourism: Managing Globalization's Impacts on
Ecotourism in Developing Countries, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 501, 506 (2002).
25 O'Neill, supra note 24, at 506.
26 Rodney R. Akers, Your Country Needs You, Too, 5 LAWYERSJ. 10 (2003); see also
United States Statement, WTO Symposium on Tourism Services, Feb. 22-23,
2001, The U.S. Travel Industry and International Tourism (Feb. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/job01_21_us.doc.
27 Buzz Aldrin & Ron Jones, Heavenly Hiltons, TECH CENTRAL STATION (Jan. 16,
2003), available at http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/techwrapper.jsp?
PID=1051-250&CID=1051-011603A.
28 Daniel O'Neil et al., General Public Space Travel and Tourism Volume 1 -Execu-
tive Summary, NASA/STA, NP-1998-03-11- MSFC (Mar. 1998).
29 Collins, supra note 18.
10 Kelly Space & Technology, Inc. completed a NASA-sponsored survey of fu-
ture space markets. As reported by Kelly Space president Robert Davis, "[w]e
found that the most easily quantifiable market that we could really touch, smell,
understand and model was private space travel for everyday citizens." Leonard
David, Space Tourism in the 21st Century: High Hopes, High Stakes, Space.com (June
29, 2001), available at http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/tourismstakes_
010629-3.html.




awareness of space tourism, Time magazine published its first
feature article on the topic in 1998.'3 In addition, both the U.S.
Government and the private sector have begun to evince a less
myopic view of space tourism. In 1998, NASA published a re-
port that endorsed the feasibility of space tourism.14 In 1999,
Virgin Airlines CEO Richard Branson announced Virgin Galac-
tic Airways, which he claimed would offer short tourist flights
into space within eight years.3 5
While short tourist flights into space have yet to materialize,
important developments have taken place. Optimistic hypothe-
ses about space tourism blossomed into dazzling reality in 2001.
In defiance of the aerospace industry's gloomy prognosis for
commercial space travel, MirCorp and Space Adventures
brokered a deal with the Russian Aviation and Space Agency to
send humanity's first tourist into space. On April 28, 2001, Den-
nis Tito paid $20 million to ride a Russian Soyuz rocket to the
International Space Station (ISS).36 Just one year later, South
African businessman Mark Shuttleworth signed a contract with
the Russian Aviation and Space Agency to become the second
space tourist to the ISS.3
7
B. SPACE TOURISM & RLVs: COSMIC SYMBIOSIS
The successful development of space tourism is inextricably
linked with favorable regulation of RLVs. As one expert stated,
"[s]pace tourism more than any other commercial space ven-
ture has the potential to support low-cost-launcher operations
and therefore justifies development of RLV technology."3" A
2001 NASA study likewise concluded that only space tourism of-
fers a large enough market to enable RLVs to reduce the cost of
getting in to orbit.39
33 See Kluger, supra note 1.
34 See O'Neil, supra note 28.
35 See Virgin Airways, Daimler Benz Eye Space Tourism, THE GLOBAL SITUATION RE-
PORT (May 10, 1999), at www.gsreport.com/articles/artOO0153.html.
36 See Brad Stone, Bezos in Space, NEWSWEEK (May 5, 2003), available at http://
stacks.msnbc.com/news/904 8 4 2.asp.
37 Id.
38 Sven Abitzsch, Prospects of Space Tourism, presented at the Ninth European
Aerospace Congress: Visions and Limits of Long-Term Aerospace Developments
(May 15, 1996).
39 Space Future, Space Tourism - The Story So Far, at http://www.spacefuture.
com/tourism/timeline.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
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Access to space has been dominated by expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs) since the inception of spaceflight in the 1950s.4"
While one-time-use rockets have an impressive track record,
they suffer from one unavoidable defect: high cost.4 1 Current
estimates put the cost of delivering one pound of cargo into
Earth's orbit at $5,000 to $10,000.42 U.S. Space Shuttles re-
present a reusable alternative to ELVs. Unfortunately, they too
are prohibitively expensive; NASA has spent more than $3 bil-
lion annually on its fleet of Shuttles.43 A Space Shuttle launch
requires several thousand support personnel and two or more
months of preparation, amounting to a launch cost of approxi-
mately $20,000 per kilogram.44 More important, the Space
Shuttle program has been a public relations disaster.45
It is not surprising, then, that a new class of spacecraft is
emerging to provide a less costly means of delivering payload.
As the name would suggest, reusable launch vehicles survive
launch and reentry. Their capacity for repeated use enables
them to recover the huge costs involved in building a launch
vehicle and provides tremendous cost benefits over compar-
able ELVs. 46 According to some estimates, RLVs could reduce




44 Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Needs Cash to Keep ISS Afloat, THE Moscow TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2003, at 1.
45 Hobby Space, Reusable Launch & Space Vehicle Information Part I - General Info,
US Projects, X Prize, at www.hobbyspace.com/Links/RLVCountdown.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2004); see also Carl Hoffman, The Right Stuff WIRED MAGAZINE (July
2003), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l1.07/space.html
(quoting Burt Rutan's less than glowing review of NASA: "NASA abandoned af-
fordability in favor of the Shuttle and now it's spending hundreds of millions to
study frog legs. I want to fly in space, and I'm tired of waiting for NASA.").
46 The Challenger accident had a deleterious effect on both government and
private space travel development. See, e.g., Thomas F. Rogers, The Prospects for
Space Tourism, SPACE FUTURE, Jan. 29, 1998 ("The tragic Shuttle Challenger disas-
ter of 1986, in which five professional astronauts and the schoolteacher, Christa
McAuliffe, were killed, saw all government and private sector space tourism ambi-
tions [set] aside. Except for the publishing of a few professional papers, activities
in this space-related area remained moribund for a half-dozen years."). Similarly,
the Columbia explosion has caused many to question whether humans are fit for
space travel at all. See, e.g., Jim Wooten, Dreaming and Soaring - After Columbia, Is
Manned Space Travel Still Worth It? Many Say Yes, ABCnews.com (July 6, 2003), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/shuttle-mannedO3O2O8.html
(wondering, in light of the Columbia accident, whether the benefits to be de-
rived from human space travel outweigh the costs, and noting the "growing
clamor for the use of robots in space"); Kelly Young, Shuttle Ground Cuts Experi-
110
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space launch costs from $10,000 per pound to $1,000 per
pound.47
Such a radical reduction has obvious implications for space
tourism - an industry whose costs are still far beyond the fiscal
grasp of most people. While few could afford to spend $20 mil-
lion dollars on a visit to space, lower price tags are sure to come
with private development of RLVs. Because space tourism de-
pends on the success of RLV development, the regulations gov-
erning this industry must be reexamined."
C. OTHER ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR RLV DEVELOPMENT
In addition to helping space tourism take off, RLV develop-
ment will be a boon to the overall commercial space industry.
This industry, like tourism, is already well established: the Satel-
lite Industry Association49 estimates that world revenues in the
commercial space industry exceeded $65 billion in 1998.50 RLV
development, and the concomitant reduction in launch costs,
will only enable this industry to grow. Whether the U.S. space
launch industry will reap the benefits of this growth-and
regain some of the market share it lost to Arianespace and other
foreign companies in the 1980s51-will depend largely on the
regulation of RLVs.
Until the 1980s, the U.S. had a virtual monopoly on the com-
mercial launching market.52 Any entity interested in launching
ments on Space Station, FLA. TODAY (Apr. 22, 2003), available at http://www.florida
today.com/columbia/columbiastory2A50254A.htm (reporting on Columbia acci-
dent and the fact that "[s]ome people outside the space community question
what humans gain from being in space, doing things that robots might do
better").
47 Moore, supra note 2, at 251.
48 Id.
4q Space Future, Space Tourism - The Story So Far, at http://www.spacefu-
ture.com/tourism/timeline.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
50 The Satellite Industry Association (SIA) is a U.S.-based trade association rep-
resenting leading U.S. and international satellite service providers, manufactur-
ers, launch services companies, and ground equipment suppliers. As stated on its
website, the SIA is "the unified voice of the commercial satellite industry on pol-
icy, regulatory, and legislative issues affecting the satellite community." See The
Satellite Industry Association's website at http://www.sia.org/ for further infor-
mation (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
51 U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, Office of Space
Commercialization, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.technology.gov/
space/about/faq.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
52 Some predict the reduction in launch costs resulting from RLV develop-
ment would allow the United States space launch industry to dominate the global
satellite launch services market. Moore, supra note 2, at 251.
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a satellite had one option: contract with NASA, which would
then deliver the payload via an ELV purchased from one of
three U.S. rocket manufacturers.13 This changed in the 1980s
when NASA began the Space Shuttle program and phased out
its ELV inventory. 4 Meanwhile, the European Space Agency
(ESA) had begun work on its Ariane rocket, an ELV that proved
to be both reliable and less expensive than NASA's Shuttle.55
The lack of NASA support for the ELV industry, combined with
the French government's "unwavering backing" of the Arianes-
pace in the form of an uncapped indemnification,56 ultimately
enabled Arianespace 7 to dominate fifty-five percent of all com-
mercial payloads between 1990 and 1995.58
Since then, other countries have joined the commercial
launch industry,59 leaving the U.S. launch providers with only 29
percent of the market in 2000, down from 49 percent in 1998. 6"
A supportive regulatory environment for RLV development
therefore is imperative if the U.S. is to remain competitive in the
commercial launch sector.61
53 Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Development
of Outer Space, 65 U. Mo. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 589, 621 (1997) (citing John C.
Garcia, Heaven or Hell: The Future of the United States Services Industry, 7 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 333, 335 (1995)).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.; see also ANN FLORINI, DEVELOPING THE FINAL FRONTIER 44 (1985) (stating
that NASA was budgeted to spend about $121 million for each of the 14 Shuttle
flights scheduled for 1986, but that fewer than half of the flights would earn that
much).
57 See Extension of Space Launch Indemnification: Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on Space and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Science, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Rep. Dana Rohra-
bacher, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, discussing
need for the U.S. to indemnify U.S. launch companies so that they can be com-
petitive with Arianespace, whose launches were indemnified by the French gov-
ernment); see also id. (statement of Patricia A. Mahoney, Chair, Satellite Industry
Association).
58 Arianespace is a multinational semi-public corporation created by the ESA
to market and operate the Ariane rocket.
59 Twibell, supra note 53, at 621.
60 Id.
61 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Technology Administration, Com-
mercial Space Trends (June 5, 2001), available at http://www.technology.gov/
Prel/pr010607.htm (indicating that U.S. providers' 29 percent market share was
down from 49 percent only two years earlier and that for the period from 1996 to
2002, projected U.S. sales growth lagged behind the rest of the world not only in
space transportation (1.5 percent, U.S., versus eight percent, rest of world) but in
satellite manufacturing (nine percent versus 13 percent)).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF RLV TECHNOLOGY
A. GOVERNMENT RLV DEVELOPMENT: A BUMPY RIDE So FAR
Both NASA and the U.S. Air Force have been involved in ex-
perimental programs to develop RLV technology.6 2 Unfortu-
nately, technical problems and funding issues have plagued the
programs, raising the question of whether government RLV de-
velopment will ever bear fruit.
In 1996, NASA unveiled its X-33 and X-34 programs to spark
development of commercial RLVs. 63  Work on the X-33
spaceplane, a single-stage-to-orbit spaceliner, was conducted in a
cooperative project between NASA and the Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics Company. As for the X-34, NASA awarded Orbital
Sciences Corporation (OSC) a contract for the design, develop-
ment, and testing of the reusable unmanned suborbital space-
craft.64 After spending more than $912 million on the X-33 and
$205 million on the X-34 project, NASA decided in 2001 to cut
funding for both programs.65 The X-33 program had exper-
ienced a myriad of technical problems and design challenges,
prompting intense renegotiation conversations between NASA
and Lockheed Martin and the ultimate decision to cut fund-
ing.66 Arthur Stephenson, director of NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center explained the decision simply: "What we're hear-
ing from industry and our own evaluation is that we believe a
single-stage-to-orbit vehicle for a second-generation vehicle... is
not viable at this time."67
Bob Haltermann, executive director of STA's Space Travel
and Tourism Division described the cancellation of the X-33
project as a step backward: "NASA spent $1 billion dollars and
Lockheed Martin spent $400 million.., and NASAjust dropped
it. That's tragic. If you're thinking about greatly reducing
launch costs, you're never going to get there by not taking
greater risks to make greater advances."68
On a more positive note, development of RLVs remains a
stated priority for NASA, and the agency has continued alone
62 Collins, supra note 18.
63 Lisa J. Savitt et al., Aviation and Aerospace: Law and Policy Developments, 36
INT'L LAw. 507, 517 (2001).
64 Leonard, supra note 30.
65 NASA, X-34 Program Background Information, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/off
ice/pao/History/x-33/x34_bginfo.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
66 Savitt, supra note 63, at 517; David, supra note 30.
67 David, supra note 30.
68 Id.
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with the X-37 program despite announcements from Boeing
and the U.S. Air Force that they would not invest any additional
funding of their own into the program. 69 NASA also recently
kicked off its $5 billion Space Launch Initiative, which allowed
for nearly $800 million of funding to several U.S. companies
and universities for RLV technology and systems engineering
development. 70
If the X-33 and X-34 programs are any indication, however, it
could be many moons before NASA develops a viable RLV.
Many are looking instead to the private sector, which has be-
come increasingly active in RLV development over the last
decade.
B. THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE RLV DEVELOPMENT
Until the 1980s, there was no commercial space transporta-
tion industry. Only the United States launched commercial
satellites, and these were launched on vehicles owned by the
government, including NASA's Space Shuttle. 71 Events of the
1980s - including the birth of Arianespace, the recognition of
the value of commercial space transportation by U.S. govern-
ment officials, and the ban of commercial payloads from flying
aboard the Space Shuttle after the Challenger disaster, pro-
moted the development of this industry in the United States.72
By 2000, U.S. commercial space transportation and the services
and industries it encompasses accounted for more than $60 bil-
lion in economic activity.73
Both the rapid growth of the commercial space transportation
industry and NASA's decision to scrap its X-33 and X-34 pro-
grams suggest that private companies are in the best position to
pursue RLV development. 74 The private sector appears to
agree. Despite the many challenges facing the RLV industry,
private development of reusable technology presses on. More
than 20 private companies worldwide are actively engaged in
RLV development, thanks in large part to the "X" Prize Founda-
69 Id.
70 Savitt, supra note 63.
71 Id.
72 Twibell, supra note 53, at 621.
73 Federal Aviation Administration, About Commercial Space Transportation, at




tion.75 Following in the footsteps of aviation incentive prizes of-
fered between 1905 and 1935, the Foundation created the "X"
Prize in 1996 to jumpstart the space tourism industry.76 The
goal of the contest is to make space travel possible for all
through competition among the most talented entrepreneurs
and rocket experts in the world. To this end, a $10 million cash
prize will be awarded to the first team that privately finances,
builds and launches a spaceship that carries three people to 100
kilometers (62.5 miles), returns safely to Earth, and repeats the
launch with the same ship within two weeks.7 7 So far, 24 teams
from seven different countries have registered with the Founda-
tion and are competing for the prize.7"
Most formidable among the competitors is Burt Rutan,79
founder of Scaled Composites. The company recently unveiled
SpaceShipOne, a white rocket ship fueled by nitrous oxide. The
ship will be launched from a turbojet carrier plane called the
White Knight. Scaled Composites has the financial backing of
an "undisclosed customer," who many aerospace insiders believe
is Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen. 0 Paul Allen would not be
the first filthy-rich entrepreneur to get involved in RLV develop-
ment. Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon and cosmically-minded bil-
lionaire, recently created a space research company called Blue
Origin."' With a staff of physicists, ex-NASA scientists, veterans
of unsuccessful space start-ups, and sci-fi writers, Blue Origin's
goal is to launch an RLV into suborbital space, with seven tour-
ists onboard, within the next few years.8 2  Likewise, PayPal
founder Elon Musk is building his own rocket company,
75 Private RLV developers are not the only companies unwilling to wait for
NASA. The Planetary Society is sponsoring a private project called "Cosmos I" to
boost a 200-pound experimental solar sailboat into high Earth orbit as early as
September 2003 without waiting for NASA, which is also working on solar sails
technology. Robert S. Boyd, NASA, Private Group Developing "Solar Sails" Vessels
Would Be Able to Travel Through Space Powered by Sunlight, THE STATE, June 5, 2003.





80 Rutan's company has been involved in numerous advanced aeronautical
projects such as the Voyager, the first aircraft to fly around the world without
refueling, and the Pegasus rocket, which is launched into space from beneath the
wing of a carrier aircraft and has placed many small satellites into orbit. David
Whitehouse, U.S. Pioneer to Offer Spaceflights, BBC NEws, May 31, 2003.
81 Stone, supra note 36.
82 The company is also known as Blue Operations, LLC.
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SpaceX, which is working on the development of a dual-stage,
liquid-oxygen-and-kerosene-powered rocket called the Falcon.
According to Musk, the Falcon will be able to launch satellites at
a cost of $6 million.83 Finally, John Carmack, the man who
coded the hugely successful games Doom and Quake, hasjoined
the quest to build an RLV. His company, Armadillo Aerospace,
is one of many competing for the "X" Prize and is one of only
three companies in pre-application consultation for a launch li-
cense with the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Space
Commercialization.8 4
IV. CHALLENGES TO RLV DEVELOPMENT
& SPACE TOURISM
While the U.S. private-sector space information industry gen-
erates nearly $68 billion a year,85 the U.S. space transportation
industry has had more difficulty getting off the ground. Accord-
ing to a report by the Office of Space Commercialization, the
U.S. space launch industry generated only $1.54 billion in 2000
and was projected to generate only $2.57 billion in 2002.86
There are many reasons the space transportation industry gen-
erally-and space tourism specifically-have been slow to de-
velop. Each of these challenges is discussed below.
A. CHALLENGE NUMBER ONE: PUBLIC PERCEPTION
The first challenge to space tourism is public perception.
Mention the concept of "space tourism" to any person and
chances are you'll be met with a dismissive roll of the eyes or an
incredulous chuckle. The so-called giggle factor-the idea that
only astronauts and cosmonauts have any business in space 87-is
one facet of the overall public-perception problem that has im-
83 Stone, supra note 36.
84 Id.
85 E-mail from John Weglian, Space Systems Development Division, Office of
the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Avia-
tion Administration (June 23, 2003, 17:41 EST) (on file with author).
86 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, Office of
Space Commercialization, Trends in Space Commerce, 1-4 (2001) [hereinafter
Trends in Space Commerce] (reporting seven-year total revenues for satellite
communications, Global Positioning System, and remote sensing industries in
the U.S. to be $476.65 billion). See also Satellite Industry Association & the Fu-
tron Corporation, Third Annual Global Satellite Industry Indicators Survey (June
2000) (reporting that the global satellite industry reached an astounding $69.1
billion in revenues for 1999).
87 Trends in Space Commerce, supra note 85, at 2-5.
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peded the development of RLV technology. The tendency to
write off space tourism as sci-fi chimera is prevalent even among
experienced aerospace systems engineers, especially those unfa-
miliar with potential new capabilities that are inherent in recent
technological advances."8 So skeptical are some in the U.S.
aerospace industry that aerospace companies' first study of the
potential market for commercial space transportation con-
cluded that space tourism was infeasible.8 9
In the early 1980s, NASA attempted to broaden public per-
ception of space tourism by launching the Space Shuttle pro-
gram.90 The Challenger disaster swiftly put a damper on these
early hopes of space tourism.91 Nearly two decades later, compa-
nies like MirCorp and Space Adventures made history when
they sent the world's first space tourist into outer space.92 As
promising as these milestones have been, the recent Columbia
disaster has once again cast a shadow over the industry, prompt-
ing many to question whether humans are fit for space travel at
all.9"
A recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll captures the
mercurial nature of American public perception and reveals an
interesting twist. Though each disaster has resulted in vocal crit-
icism of the Shuttle program, the poll indicates that American
support for increasing NASA's budget actually increased after
both Challenger and Columbia. 94 Of those people polled in
2003, only 17 percent believed NASA spending should be de-
creased, compared with 41 percent in 1993.15 In addition, only
17 percent of people polled said any Shuttle accident was unac-
88 Patrick Collins & Koichi Yonemoto, Legal and Regulatory Issues for Passenger
Space Travel, Address at 49th International Astronautical Federation Congress,
Sept. 28 - Oct. 2, 1998; Abitzsch, supra note 38.
89 Collins & Yonemoto, supra note 88.
9o Space Future, Space Tourism - The Story So Far, at http://www.spacefuture.
com/tourism/timeline.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
91 NASA launched its first Space Shuttle in 1981. NASA, Space Shuttle, Operat-
ing the World's Most Versatile Launch System (2000), at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/off
ice/pao/facts/HTML/FS-005-HQ.html.
92 See, e.g., supra note 45; Dunstan, supra note 5, at 232.
93 On April 28, 2001, Dennis Tito paid $20 million to visit the International
Space Station. One year later, South African businessman Mark Shuttleworth
signed a contract with the Russian Aviation and Space Agency to become the
second space tourist to the ISS. See Stone, supra note 36.
94 See, e.g., supra note 45.
95 See Alan Levin & Traci Watson, NASA Support Up After Tragedy, USA TODAY,
Aug. 19, 2003.
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ceptable. 6 While such statistics are encouraging, the poll also
suggests that America's support is qualified: when asked about
other areas of spending, people overwhelmingly favored other
programs over the space program.97
Despite these challenges, plans to send the next pair of space
tourists into orbit are underway.9" With each new space tourist
to reach orbit will come greater public acceptance of the notion
of commercial space travel. However, until space tourism ceases
to cater exclusively to the upper economic echelon of society,
average people will continue to view the industry as nothing
more than an oddity. The development of RLVs is therefore
crucial to lowering launch costs and making space tourism ac-
cessible to a broader base of people. The evolution of aviation
provides a heartening model: services that come with exorbitant
price tags eventually come down to earth. Air travel-a luxury
once beyond the financial grasp of most people-is now availa-
ble and affordable to some one billion people all around the
world. 99
B. CHALLENGE NUMBER Two: INTERNATIONAL SPACE
STATION OBLIGATIONS
Another impediment to the development of space tourism is
the International Space Station's crippling dependence on Rus-
sian rockets-the only vehicles that have thus far been used to
send tourists into space. The Columbia disaster was a sad re-
minder that space tourism is a fragile business in a polycentric
universe of international obligations and economic limitations.
Shortly after the Columbia perished, NASA grounded its re-
maining Shuttle fleet. Without the Shuttles and their 25-ton-
payload capacity,10 Russian Progress cargo freighters and Soyuz
rockets represented the only reliable means of delivering food,
supplies, and replacement crews to the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS). In an effort to make all of its rockets available, the
Russian Aviation and Space Agency announced it would sus-
96 Id.
97 Id. Forty-three percent of the people polled considered one accident for
every 100 flights acceptable. In a total of 113 flights, two Shuttles have crashed.
98 Id. Of those polled, 74 percent rated health care a higher priority than the
space program, and 60 percent rated defense spending a higher priority than the
space program. Welfare was the only program to be rated a lower priority than
the space program.
99 Coming Soon: Millionaires in Space (the Sequel), REUTERS, June 19, 2003.
100 Collins & Yonemoto, supra note 88.
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pend its space tourist program indefinitely and dropped plans
to send a third tourist to the space station in April 2003. °10 Only
in June did the agency announce its intentions to resume space
tourism operations by signing an agreement with Space Adven-
tures to send two tourists to the space station at the beginning of
2005.102
C. CHALLENGE NUMBER THREE: RLV REGULATORY REGIME
The final obstacle to space tourism is a burdensome and com-
plex regulatory regime-both internationally and domesti-
cally-for RLV operations and licensing. This regime is
discussed in greater detail in Section IV.
Internationally, the biggest challenge to RLV operations is the
fact that RLV operations are subject to strict liability, 10 3 a stan-
dard that has costly ramifications for RLV developers. Most sig-
nificantly, a strict liability standard forces entities involved in
RLV launching to purchase expensive liability insurance.
Domestically, recently issued regulations governing licensing
requirements represent a blessing and a curse. In 1998, Con-
gress recognized the need to enable the private sector to under-
take space development and passed the Commercial Space Act
(CSA)104 The CSA laid the regulatory groundwork for RLV li-
censing and opened the commercial launch industry up to the
private sector. While current regulations are a vast improve-
ment on the past framework, which lacked any RLV-specific reg-
ulation, launch and reentry licensing requirements may prove
too complex and time-consuming for some RLV developers.
Perhaps not surprisingly, not a single RLV developer has ap-
plied for a license.1"5
V. RLV REGULATORY REGIME
A. LIABILFIY AND INDEMNIFICATION
Internationally, RLV operations are subject to the general
prescriptions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
101 Ferreira-Marques, Clara, Russia Says Shuttle Disaster Could Jeopardize ISS,
REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2003.
102 Russia Suspends 'Space Tourism, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/2722225.stm.
103 Coming Soon: Millionaires in Space (the Sequel), REUTERS, June 19, 2003.
104 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 6; Liability Convention,
supra note 19, at art. 2.
105 Commercial Space Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 14701 (2003).
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ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 10 6 which provides in
relevant part that "State Parties to this Treaty shall bear interna-
tional responsibility for national activities in outer
space.. .whether such activities are carried on by governmental
agencies or non-governmental entities."10' The Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects0 ' is
even more explicit, prescribing that a launching state "shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its
space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight."109
Like international law governing RLV activities, U.S. domestic
law imposes strict liability on parties who launch space vehi-
cles. 110 As a result of this liability regime, the Commercial Space
Launch Act (CSLA) requires entities that launch space vehicles
to purchase $500 million in third-party liability insurance.1
The government will cover excess damages up to $1.5 billion,
but the launch company is liable for any amount beyond the $2
billion total. 112
B. EVOLUTION OF RLV-SPECIFIC LICENSING REGULATION
In the mid-1990s, prospective RLV operators identified the
lack of adequate regulatory oversight over RLV operations-and
in particular over their reentry-as an obstacle to RLV develop-
ment. 1 3 These operators believed that a stable and predictable
regulatory environment for RLV licensing was critical to the in-
dustry's ability to obtain the capital investment necessary for re-
106 E-mail from Esta Rosenberg, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Avi-
ation Administration to author (June 19, 2003, 12:08 EST) (on file with author).
107 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19.
108 Id. at art. 6.
109 Liability Convention, supra note 19.
110 Id. at art. 2.
111 Dunstan, supra note 5, at 229; historical notes to 49 U.S.C. Pub. L. No. 106-
405, § 7, Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1752 ("[n]ot later than 18 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall transmit to the
Congress a report on the liability risk-sharing regime in the United States for
commercial space transportation... [in which it will] examine the appropriate-
ness of deeming all space transportation activities to be 'ultrahazardous activities'
for which a strict liability standard may be applied").
112 49 U.S.C. § 70112.
113 Id. § 70113.
120
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRAVEL
search and development.114 The government ultimately agreed.
In 1995, the U.S. Government's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation became a part of the FAA and immediately be-
gan working on developing a licensing procedure for commer-
cially operated reusable space vehicles. 115
Three years later, Congress passed the CSA, 116 which ex-
tended the Secretary of Transportation's licensing authority
under the CSLA to reentry vehicle operators and operation of
reentry sites by non-Federal entities. 17 The Secretary's licensing
authority was delegated to the Administrator of the FAA and fur-
ther assigned to the Associate Administrator for Commercial
Space Transportation (FAA/AST).118 In essence, the CSA au-
thorized the FAA/AST to license commercial space transporta-
tion vehicles to reenter Earth's atmosphere and return space
payloads to Earth-an essential requirement for companies de-
veloping passenger space vehicles. 9
The CSA was the first step in developing an RLV framework
and removing regulatory obstacles to RLV licensing and devel-
opment. 120 Not long after enactment of the CSA, the FAA initi-
ated rulemaking to define and implement the licensing process
for RLV missions. 121 On September 19, 2000, FAA/AST re-
leased the Final Rule of the Commercial Space Transportation
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations
(Final Rule).122 The Final Rule amends commercial space trans-
portation licensing regulations by establishing operational and
licensing requirements for launches and reentry of RLVs.
1 23
114 Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry
Licensing Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 56,618 (Department of Transportation, FAA,
Sept. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Final Rule].
115 Id.
116 Collins & Yonemoto, supra note 88.
117 42 U.S.C. § 14701.
11s Id. § 14714.
119 Final Rule, supra note 114.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 The FAA issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Licensing and
Safety Requirements for Launch on April 21, 1999. Id.
123 The Final Rule was effective November 20, 2000. Id.
20041
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C. FAA/AST FINAL RULE: RLV LAUNCH
AND REENTRY LICENSING
1. Covered Activities and Types of License
The Final Rule defines reentry vehicles to include RLVs that
are designed to return from Earth's orbit or outer space to
Earth, substantially intact. 124 Until recently, it was unclear
whether this definition included suborbital RLVs. 125 An FAA no-
tice published in the Federal Register in October 2003 resolved
the ambiguity: "Suborbital RLVs, including those that employ
traditional aviation characteristics, such as wings and landing
gear, are regulated under the RLV mission licensing require-
ments [of the Final Rule]."126
Under the Final Rule, a person or entity must obtain a license
to launch a launch vehicle from the United States, operate a
launch site within the United States, reenter a vehicle in the
United States, or operate a reentry site in the United States.1 27
Additionally, United States citizens must obtain a license to
124 Final Rule, supra note 114.
125 Id.
126 Jeff Foust, Easing Regulatory Uncertainty, THE SPACE REVIEW (Nov. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/57/1. The Commercial
Space Launch Act of 1984 confers exclusive regulatory authority over launches of
a "suborbital rocket" on a "suborbital trajectory" on the AST. However, neither
the statute nor the Final Rule defines "suborbital" in terms of altitude or vehicle
characteristics, breeding uncertainty as to whether suborbital vehicles would be
regulated as aircraft or as launch vehicles. As a practical matter, the AST issued a
number of suborbital launch licenses for commercial sounding rocket flights; the
regulatory status of X-Prize type suborbital vehicles (those with characteristics of
both aircraft and launch vehicles) was less clear. Most suborbital vehicle develop-
ers assumed that they would be regulated by AST as launch vehicles. Burt Rutan
challenged that assumption in April at the unveiling of SpaceShipOne, when he
said that he planned to fly the vehicle under an experimental airworthiness certif-
icate (EAC) rather than obtain a launch license. An EAC is issued by the FAA's
Office of the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification (AVR) and
is usually easier to obtain than a launch license. While an EAC can offer the
vehicle operator more flexibility than a launch license, it precludes the vehicle
from being put into commercial service. Instead, the vehicle must be certified by
AVR, a process that can take years and cost ten or more times the amount spent
to develop the vehicle itself. Id.
127 Id. (citing 68 F.R. 59977, Oct. 20. 2003). In addition, many suborbital vehi-
cle developers continue to press for passage of the Commercial Space Transpor-
tation Act of 2003 (S. 1260), which would give the Secretary of Transportation six
months to submit a report to Congress on the need for a clear regulatory regime
for suborbital vehicles, and the Commercial Space Act of 2003 (H.R. 3245),
which would direct the FAA to regulate suborbital vehicles as launch vehicles. A
preference for these bills is understandable - what can be done in the Federal
Register could also be undone in the Register at some later date, while regula-
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launch or reenter a vehicle or to operate a launch site or reentry
site outside of the United States. 121
An RLV operator has the choice between two types of licenses:
an RLV mission-specific license 129 or an RLV mission-operator
license.1i 0 A mission-specific license "authorizes an RLV mission
to launch and reenter, or otherwise land, one model of RLV
from a launch site approved for the mission to a reentry site."''
This type of license may authorize more than one RLV mission
and identifies each flight authorized under the license.1 3 2
Under this license, authorization to conduct RLV missions ter-
minates upon completion of all activities authorized by the li-
cense or the license's expiration date, whichever occurs first. 33
By contrast, a mission-operator license "authorizes a licensee to
launch and reenter, or otherwise land, any of a designated fam-
ily of RLVs within authorized parameters, including launch sites
and trajectories, transporting specified classes of payloads to any
reentry site or other location designated in the license." '134 A
mission-operator license is valid for a two-year renewable
term. 135
2. Licensing and Approval Process
The RLV application and licensing process is complicated, to
put it mildly. Perhaps recognizing the trepidation RLV develop-
ers might experience in attempting to navigate these require-
ments, FAA/AST recently hosted an RLV Mission License
Application Workshop to help developers better understand the
application process.' 36 Included in its presentation was a brief-
ing on the steps involved in an RLV mission license application.
The briefing, alas, was uncharacteristically lengthy at a whop-
ping 195 pages." 7
tions written into federal law would be substantially more difficult to change.
Foust, supra note 126.
128 14 C.F.R. § 413.3 (2003).
129 Id.
130 14 C.F.R. § 431.3(a).
131 14 C.F.R. § 431.3(b).
132 14 C.F.R. § 431.3(a).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 14 C.F.R. § 431.3(b).
136 Id.
137 Letter from Herbert Bachner, Manager, Space System Development Divi-
sion, Federal Aviation Administration to author (received July 2, 2003) (on file
with author).
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One explanation for such a long and involved application
process is FAA/AST's unwavering emphasis on safety. Under
the Final Rule, FAA/AST assumes the Secretary's mandate
under the CSLA to ensure that public health and safety are not
jeopardized by licensed operations."l 8 In the context of RLV li-
censing, "[t]he FAA evaluates on an individual basis all public
safety aspects of a proposed RLV mission to ensure they are suf-
ficient to support safe conduct of the mission.11 39 RLV license
applicants consequently face a grueling, multi-pronged consul-
tation and approval process. Before applying for a license, pro-
spective applicants must participate in pre-application
consultations with FAA/AST to discuss the application process
and potential issues relevant to FAA/AST's licensing decision.14 °
Following pre-application consultations, applicants must obtain
policy approval, safety approval, payload and payload reentry ap-
proval, and environmental approval.14 ' Successful applicants
additionally must fulfill ongoing obligations during the term of
license. Each of these requirements is discussed separately in
the following paragraphs.
i. Policy Approval
The FAA issues a policy approval to an RLV mission license
applicant upon completion of a favorable policy review.' 42 In
considering whether to grant policy approval, FAA/AST will re-
view an application to "determine whether the proposed mis-
sion presents any issues. . . that would adversely affect U.S.
national security or foreign policy interests, would jeopardize
public health and safety or the safety of property, or would not
be consistent with international obligations of the United
States."'1 43 In an RLV mission license application, applicants
must:
a) Identify the model, type, and configuration of any RLV
proposed for launch and reentry;' 44
138 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, RLV Mission License Application Workshop
Version 1.1, PowerPoint slides from RLV Mission License Application Workshop
(May 2003).
139 14 C.F.R. § 431.31.
140 Id.
141 14 C.F.R. § 413.5.
142 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 431.5, 431.7, 341.91.
14S 14 C.F.R. § 431.21.
144 14 C.F.R. § 431.23.
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b) Identify all vehicle systems, including structural, thermal,
pneumatic, propulsion, electrical, and avionics and gui-
dance systems used in the vehicle(s), and all propel-
lants;'45
c) Identify foreign ownership... ;146 [and]
d) Identify proposed launch and reentry flight profile(s),
including, launch and reentry site(s), flight trajectories
[and] reentry trajectories, and sequence of planned
events or maneuvers during the mission.' 47
ii. Safety Approval
The FAA conducts a safety review of an RLV license applica-
tion to determine whether applicants are capable of launching
and landing an RLV without jeopardizing public health and
safety.14 In order to obtain safety approval, RLV license appli-
cants must:
a) Maintain a safety organization and document it by identi-
fying lines of communication and approval authority for
all mission decisions that might affect public safety; 1 49
b) Designate a person responsible for the conduct of all
licensed RLV mission activities; 151
c) Designate a qualified safety official authorized by the
applicant to examine all safety aspects of the applicant's
operations and to complete a mission readiness determi-
nation before an RLV mission is initiated;15 1 and
d) Demonstrate that the proposed mission does not exceed
levels of acceptable risk. 152
To demonstrate compliance with acceptable risk criteria, RLV
license applicants must:
a) Identify and describe the physical structure of the RLV;15 1
145 14 C.F.R. § 431.25 (a).
146 14 C.F.R. § 431.25(b).
147 14 C.F.R. § 431.25(c).
148 14 C.F.R. § 431.25(d).
149 14 C.F.R. § 431.31.
150 14 C.F.R. § 431.33(a).
151 14 C.F.R. § 431.33(b).
152 14 C.F.R. § 431.33(c).
153 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(a). The risk level to the collective members of the pub-
lic exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris impact hazards associated with a proposed
mission may not exceed an expected average of .00003 casualties per mission.
The risk level to an individual may not exceed .00000 1 per mission. Four quanti-
ties factor into this equation: the size of the area over which possible debris im-
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b) Identify and describe any hazardous materials and their
container on the RLV; 154
c) Identify and describe safety-critical systems 15 5 and safety-
critical failure modes and their consequences; 156
d) Provide drawings, schematics, and timelines for each
safety-critical system; 157 and
e) Provide flight trajectory analyses covering launch or
ascent of the vehicle through orbital insertion and reen-
try or descent of the vehicle.15 8
iii. Payload Reentry Review
The FAA will conduct a payload reentry review of any non-
U.S. government payload whose reentry is not subject to regula-
tion by another federal agency.' 59 In conducting this review, the
FAA will determine whether the reentry of the payload presents
any issues that would adversely affect U.S. national security or
foreign policy interests, jeopardize public health and safety or
the safety of property, or would not be consistent with interna-
tional obligations of the United States. 6 ° Applicants requesting
payload reentry review must identify the following:
a) Payload name or class and function; 6 '
b) Physical characteristics of the payload; 162
c) Payload owner and operator; 63
d) Type, amount, and container of hazardous or radioactive
materials in the payload; 16 4
e) Explosive potential of the payload;165
pact could occur, the probability of fragment impact on the area if a launch
vehicle failure occurs, the effective hazard area for an impacting piece of debris,
and the number of people within the area that are at risk from debris impacts.
Moore, supra note 2, at 257; see also Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Hazard Analysis
of Commercial Space Transportation 9-8 to 9-9, at http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/
hazard.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
154 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d)(1).
155 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d) (2).
156 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d) (3).
157 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d) (4).
158 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d)(5)-(6).
159 14 C.F.R. § 431.35(d) (8).
160 14 C.F.R. § 431.51.
161 14 C.F.R. § 431.55 (a).
162 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(a).
163 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(b).
164 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(c).
165 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(d).
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f) Designated reentry site of the payload;166 and
g) Method of securing the payload on the RLV. 167
iv. Environmental Review
RLV applicants must provide the FAA with sufficient informa-
tion to assess the environmental impacts associated with the pro-
posed RLV operation.16 Specifically, applicants must provide
information concerning:
a) A designated launch and reentry site, including abort
locations, if not covered by existing FAA or federal envi-
ronmental documentation;16
b) A proposed new RLV or reentry site with characteristics
falling outside the parameters of existing environmental
documentation; 170
c) A proposed payload that may have significant environ-
mental impacts in the event of a reentry accident; 71 and
d) Other factors necessary to comply with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act.'72
v. Post-Licensing Obligations of RLV Operators
An RLV operator that obtains a license is subject to a series of
ongoing obligations throughout the course of that license.
First, "a licensee is responsible for ensuring the safe conduct of
an RLV mission and for protecting public health and safety and
the safety of property during the conduct of the mission" and
must perform safety procedures in accordance with the repre-
sentations made in its license application. 171 In addition, a li-
censee must provide the FAA with the following:
a) Within 60 days prior to an authorized RLV mission, a
report containing flight and payload information for that
mission;"'
166 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(e).
167 14 C.F.R. § 431.57(0.
168 14 C.F.R. § 43 1.5 7 (g).
169 14 C.F.R. § 431.91.
170 14 C.F.R. § 431.93(a).
171 14 C.F.R. § 431.93(b)-(c).
172 14 C.F.R. § 431.93(d).
173 14 C.F.R. § 431.93(e).
174 14 C.F.R. § 431.71.
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b) Within 15 days before an authorized RLV mission, a noti-
fication of the time and date of the intended launch and
reentry;17
5
c) In the event of a launch or reentry accident or incident, a
report to be submitted to the FAA Washington Opera-
tions Center.1 1
6
Finally, an RLV licensee is required to maintain for three
years all records, data, and other material necessary to verify that
a licensed RLV mission is conducted in accordance with repre-
sentations contained in the licensee's application. 7
3. Unique Safety Concerns of RLVs & Risk Levels
RLVs, by virtue of their capacity for reentry, present unique
safety issues.17 8 As noted above, safety is of the utmost concern
in the RLV licensing process. FAA/AST is required by law to
carry out the Secretary's regulatory responsibilities and safety
mandate under the CSLA to ensure that licensed operations do
notjeopardize public health and safety.' 79 Accordingly, one cru-
cial element of the safety approval process is a demonstration by
the applicant that the proposed mission falls within acceptable
risk parameters.1 8 0
The acceptable flight risk of any commercial launch vehicle is
calculated through orbital insertion.' An applicant will not ob-
tain safety approval unless the risk level associated with his
launch proposal is less than a collective risk of thirty casualties in
one million launches, or .00003 casualties per launch. 82 ELV
regulations set an identical minimum risk level, but do not con-
tain the additional requirement found in the RLV regulations
that the risk level to an individual not exceed .000001 per
mission.
175 14 C.F.R. § 431.79(a).
176 14 C.F.R. § 431.79(b).
177 14 C.F.R. § 431.79(c).
178 14 C.F.R. § 431.77(a).
179 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 56,618 (stating "[A]ithough the FAA has had a
regulatory program in place for years governing launch licensing, the FAA deter-
mined that licensing regulations developed to address existing ELV commercial
launch capability were not adequate to address the unique safety issues posed by
launch vehicles that are reusable.").
180 Id.




The operation of an RLV carries more potential risk than the
operation of an ELV.18 3 Because an RLV is designed to survive
reentry and return to a particular reentry site, the likelihood of
damage is doubled. Another reason the risk associated with an
RLV is greater is that it uses a thermal protection system-if an
RLV explodes during the launch portion of the flight, the result-
ing debris would probably not disintegrate as easily as the debris
caused by a similar ELV failure. 84 The heat of a rocket explo-
sion would more likely cause the debris from an ELV to break
into smaller pieces as it approached the ground. In contrast, an
RLV failure would most likely result in larger and more danger-
ous pieces of debris because the thermal protection system
would keep heat in check and prevent further disintegration.1
8 5
Additionally, the larger debris from an RLV failure would also
have a higher lift coefficient, which would make debris more
likely to fly and disperse over a larger area than debris from a
comparable ELV failure. 18 6 Finally, an RLV is not designed to
destroy itself during the launch process because they are in-
tended for repeated use. RLV designers consequently will be
more inclined to build their vehicles with higher fault
tolerances. 87
Given that RLVs are inherently more dangerous than ELVs, it
is reasonable to regulate RLVs more stringently than ELVs."'8
However, existing requirements for RLV licensing may ulti-
mately prevent many private companies from getting off the
ground. As discussed above, any entity wishing to launch an
RLV faces a formidable and lengthy application process.
Whether the many RLV application requirements will prove too
onerous is difficult to ascertain as there are no examples to pro-
vide guidance. At publication, no RLV licenses have been issued
by FAA/AST. According to Esta Rosenberg, Senior Counsel for
the Department of Transportation of Commercial Space Trans-
portation, several companies are in pre-application consultation
with FAA/AST, but none has submitted an official
application. 89
183 Id.
184 Moore, supra note 2, at 247.
185 Id. at 258.
186 Id. at 258-59.
187 Id. at 259.
188 Id. at 263.
189 Final Rule, supra note 114, at 56,619 ("ELVs rely upon destructive flight ter-
mination systems (FTS) that assure flight safety by destroying a vehicle traveling
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VI. REFORM & IMPROVEMENT: CURRENT
AND FUTURE MEASURES
If the U.S. commercial space and RLV industries are to thrive,
regulatory reform and improved interaction with RLV develop-
ers are necessary. FAA/AST has taken many steps to assist and
cooperate with RLV developers. While these efforts are a step in
the right direction, further reform is needed. First, as some
have argued, deregulation may be in order. Second, greater
government indemnification and risk allocation are necessary.
Finally, the RLV licensing process must be simplified.
A. FAA/AST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE RLV
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
FAA/AST is not unaware of the obstacles facing RLV develop-
ers and has taken several measures to improve the RLV land-
scape and assist RLV developers. In particular, FAA/AST has
established a committee to address commercial space policy is-
sues, hosted workshops to help RLV developers better under-
stand the licensing process, sought industry members' input on
future policy matters relating to human space flight, and made
available several reports on commercial space policy. These ef-
forts, discussed below, are a step in the right direction and re-
flect FAA/AST's collaborative, open-minded approach to RLV
regulation.
1. COMSTA C
The Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
(COMSTAC) was established in 1984 to address issues relating
to the U.S. commercial space industry.19 ° COMSTAC consists of
representatives and officials from the U.S. commercial space
transportation industry, the satellite industry, state government,
academia, and space advocacy organizations.191 Its goals are to
provide a forum for the discussion of problems involving the
beyond approved limits. Timely activation of an FTS assures that vehicle debris
will impact within a designated and unpopulated area so as to avoid all injury to
the public. Unlike an ELV, an RLV may rely upon non-destructive means of end-
ing vehicle flight, such as returning to the launch site or use of an alternative
landing site, in the event of a vehicle malfunction or anomalous circumstance
affecting the ability to conclude a mission as planned.").
190 Rosenberg, supra note 106.
191 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, What is COMSTAC?, at http://ast.faa.gov/
comstac/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
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relationship between industry activities and government require-
ments and to provide information, advice, and recommenda-
tions to the FAA on approaches for federal commercial space
policies. 19 2 COMSTAC bases its recommendations on the re-
ports of working groups. If a report is adopted by the full COM-
STAC Committee, it is then submitted to the FAA Administrator
as an official industry recommendation. The Committee cur-
rently has four working groups: Technology and Innovation,
Launch Operations and Support, Risk Management, and Reus-
able Launch Vehicles.
The RLV Working Group is headed by Michael Kelly, Chair-
man and Chief Technical Officer of Kelly Space & Technology,
Inc.,193 and is responsible for analyzing key technical, policy,
and regulatory issues concerning RLV development and RLV
operations."' In April 1999, the RLV Working Group released
its draft "Final Report on RLV Licensing Approaches," 195 in
which it endorsed a regulatory framework that allows for individ-
ualized approaches to RLV licensing.196 A single licensing re-
gime, the group concluded, "could inhibit innovation, technical
advancement, and competition in the emerging RLV
industry." '197
2. RLV Mission License Application Workshop
FAA/AST has also begun working directly with RLV develop-
ers to help them better understand the RLV licensing process
and to receive their input on future policy matters regarding
commercial human space flight policy. In furtherance of this
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. Kelly Space has also been working with NASA on space transportation
issues. In September 1999, NASA awarded the company a $2.1 million contract
to continue work on NASA's Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS).
Press Release, Kelly Space & Technology, Inc., Kelly Space & Technology Wins $2.1
Million NASA Contract (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://www.kellyspace.com/
newpress.html.
195 Comstac, supra note 191, at http://ast.faa.gov/comstac/.
196 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, COMSTAC, RLV Working Group, Final Report
on RLV Licensing Approaches (1999), available at http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/fnl-
rlvla_4_99.pdf.
197 Id. at 129 ("The RLV Working Group concluded, therefore, that a single
licensing regime to serve all concepts is not only improbable, but also undesir-
able. Rather, RLV regulations should provide a legal framework within which a
clear path to licensing can be determined for each system configuration.").
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goal, FAA/AST hosted a COMSTAC meeting devoted to RLV
issues in May 2003.198
One portion of the meeting was an RLV Mission License Ap-
plication Workshop for RLV developers.' 99 The purpose of the
workshop was to enhance the efficiency of RLV developers' ap-
plication preparation process.20 0 To this end, FAA/AST in-
cluded in its presentation a briefing on RLV launch and reentry
regulation and the steps involved in an RLV mission license ap-
plication. Following the workshop, FAA/AST made the brief-
ing, as well as other materials, available to RLV developers and
other interested individuals on CD.20 1 Also included on the CD
was a 12-page license application checklist, several advisory cir-
culars, and an environmental licensing tutorial.20 2
Another segment of the meeting dealt with commercial
human space flight policy concerns. 2 3 In connection with this
initiative, the agency is developing vehicle and human safety-re-
lated guidelines for commercial RLVs and has awarded a con-
tract to the Aerospace Corporation (through Volpe) to provide
technical assistance.20 4
FAA/AST hopes ultimately to answer four questions relating
to human space flight:
1) How does the addition of humans on board RLVs affect
FAA/AST's regulatory responsibility and regulatory
approach?
2) Should FAA/AST regulate human space flight by setting a
limit on acceptable risk for humans on board RLVs?
3) How should FAA/AST ensure the safety of humans on
board RLVs?
198 Id.
199 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, COMSTAC, COMSTAC Meeting Notice, at
http://ast.faa.gov/comstac/meetings.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
200 Bachner, supra note 137.
201 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, RLV Mission License Application Workshop
Version 1.1, PowerPoint slides from RLV Mission License Application Workshop
(2003).
202 Bachner, supra note 137.
203 Id.
204 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, RLV Mission License Workshop, Commercial




4) What, if any, type of liability, financial responsibility re-
quirements, and/or liability risk-sharing regime should
the U.S. government, via FAA/AST, seek to establish to
protect passengers on board RLVs?2°5
FAA/AST intends to continue its development of human
space flight safety guidelines. 20 6 Its proposed next step is to seek
comments from the commercial space transportation industry
and from the public.
3. Reports & Studies
Finally, FAA/AST and COMSTAC continue to produce re-
ports and studies relating to commercial space regulatory issues.
The reports and studies address issues such as the liability and
risk-sharing regime for U.S. commercial space transportation,
and RLV licensing and safety. In an effort to keep RLV develop-
ers well-informed, these reports, along with materials from work-
shops and meetings are available on the FAA/AST website. 20 7
B. THE CASE FOR DEREGULATION
Existing FAA/AST regulations of RLV licensing-while not
without purpose-impede the development of the commercial
space industry, prompting many to advocate deregulation.20 8
An unfettered, or at least less burdensome, RLV regulatory re-
gime would enable the U.S. to increase its market share in the
commercial space launch industry. In contrast, existing RLV
regulations will undoubtedly facilitate the continued foreign
domination of the commercial space market for the very simple
reason that they limit U.S. companies' ability to compete with
foreign companies. A foreign company, after all, is not subject
to U.S. RLV regulation unless it conducts a launch in the U.S. 2°9
Opposition to deregulation is typically connected with two is-
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 In attempting to answer these questions, FAA/AST has suggested that pas-
sengers will not be allowed on board RLVs until a flight test program has been
successfully completed to validate predicted flight environments, flight control
characteristics, safety critical design parameters, preflight analysis, and analytical
math models. As for liability concerns and risk-sharing regimes, current insur-
ance requirements would protect parties uninvolved in launch or reentry activi-
ties but would not cover losses or damages that passengers may experience.
Thus, further insurance and liability requirements are necessary. Id.
208 See The Federal Aviation Administration, Reports & Studies, at http://
ast.faa.gov/rep-study/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
209 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 18.
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sues: (1) economics and (2) safety.2 10 Each of these concerns is
addressed below.
The first argument is rooted in the fear that removing regula-
tory impediments will adversely affect existing commercial inter-
ests by eliminating government contracts and creating new
competitors. However, this concern has limited application to
the space transport industry.21' Although companies that re-
ceive contracts from government agencies may lose some busi-
ness, deregulation would ultimately benefit the commercial
space industry by removing the huge and potentially insur-
mountable costs of complying with FAA/AST requirements and
enabling a greater number of companies to enter the RLV mar-
ket. This influx of new competitors in the commercial space
launch sector may drive some existing companies out of busi-
ness, but the overall benefits of deregulation would outweigh
the harms. First, once the RLV industry gains momentum, the
reduction in launch costs will help U.S. companies regain a
competitive edge over foreign companies. Second, deregula-
tion will reduce costs to taxpayers.212 Apart from satellite appli-
cation, space agencies' activities are not profitable in any
country, and in fact, represent a net cost to taxpayers of some
$20 billion per year. By facilitating competition among private
companies, deregulation would reduce costs to society to the ex-
tent that it renders government-funded space expenditure
unnecessary. 213
The second common objection to deregulation is that it will
threaten the public safety that existing regulation serves to pro-
tect. This argument also rings hollow for several reasons. First,
removing certain regulatory obstacles to RLV licensing would
not necessarily lead to slipshod operations of launch vehicles.
Other regulations exist to provide a compelling impetus for safe
operations of launches. The CLSA, for example, makes parties
who launch space vehicles liable for damages in excess of $2
billion. Second, few businesspeople, if any, would risk the finan-
cial ruin that would surely result from a launch malfunction or
accident. The devastation following the Challenger and Colum-
bia disasters leaves no doubt that public perception plays an
enormous role in the space transport industry, providing ample
210 14 C.F.R. § 413.3 (requiring U.S. citizens to obtain a launch license, regard-
less of whether the launch occurs on U.S. territory).





motivation for RLV operators to ensure high levels of safety for
their passengers. Finally, there is no reason to demand near
perfect levels of safety from the space transport industry when
much lower levels are acceptable elsewhere. In the U.S. alone,
nearly 40,000 people die each year in automobile accidents. 214
As a society, we have determined that this number of fatalities is
an acceptable trade-off for the benefits we receive from automo-
biles. One wonders why we would be unwilling to tolerate simi-
lar risk levels in the space transport sector when the
development of RLV technology carries so many potential
benefits. 215
C. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT INDEMNIFICATION
AND RISK ALLOCATION
Unless the U.S. government creates a more supportive envi-
ronment for commercial launch providers, foreign companies-
in particular Arianespace-will continue to dominate the com-
mercial launch sector. Continued and improved risk sharing is
imperative if U.S. launch providers are to remain competitive in
the global arena.216
The current system of government indemnification under the
CSLA requires launch service providers to obtain insurance of
$500 million to cover claims by third parties and $100 million to
protect against claims by the government.217 The FAA recently
endorsed this partial indemnification arrangement as striking a
balance between safety and competitiveness.2 1 1 While partial in-
demnification is better than no indemnification, the U.S. system
nonetheless limits domestic companies' ability to compete with
foreign companies whose governments provide more protec-
tion. Arianespace, for example, is backed by the French govern-
ment's very generous risk-sharing program. In contrast to the
214 Id.
215 U.S. Department of Transportation, A Comparison of Risk, AccidentalDeaths
- United States - 1994-1998, at http://hazmat.dot.gov/riskcompare.htm (last vis-
itedJan. 22, 2004).
216 Improved RLV technology would lead to advances in medical and
microgravity research as well as lower costs in commercial services such as tele-
communications, data relay, and same-day international package delivery. 65
Fed. Reg. 56,618 (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 400 (2003)). In addition, some estimate
that space tourism could be a $10-20 billion-a-year industry. O'Neil, supra note
28.
217 See Hearings, supra note 57.
21s 49 U.S.C. § 70112 (2003).
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U.S. approach, there is no cap on the French government's in-
demnification of third party claims. 219
One significant consequence is that U.S. launch companies
are required to buy more insurance. As of 1999, U.S. launch
companies were required to purchase up to $164 million in in-
surance before the U.S. government would be required to cover
any excess liability claims, while Arianespace would be required
to purchase only $63 million before the French government
would step in.220 Unfortunately, insurance companies' confi-
dence concerning the scale of risks involved in space transport
depends on agreed standards of acceptable risk.22 Such stan-
dards are difficult to ascertain given the limited statistical base
for insurance calculations.222  Insurance companies conse-
quently have been reluctant to insure space transport compa-
nies, giving rise to one unavoidable conclusion: "[I]f tourism is
to become a vital part of the commercial space equation, limits
on liability for the owners and operators of space facilities and
vehicles will be a necessity. 223
D. SIMPLIFY THE RLV LICENSING PROCESS
As discussed above, FAA/AST has taken numerous steps to
work with RLV developers and assist them in the licensing pro-
cess. Nonetheless, the application requirements-from pre-ap-
plication consultations to safety, policy, payload, and
environmental approval to ongoing reporting obligations-have
the potential to overwhelm even the most resolute applicant.
Perhaps not surprisingly, FAA/AST has yet to issue an RLV li-
cense. 224 In fact, not a single company has even applied for a
license, though three companies are in pre-application consulta-
219 Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, Liability Risk-Sharing Regime for U.S. Commercial
Space Transportation: Study and Analysis (2003) (finding that the current regime is
appropriate due to the inherently high risk of the industry; effective considering
the impeccable safety record of U.S. launch providers; and necessary to keep U.S.
launch providers internationally competitive).
220 See Hearings, supra note 57 (opening statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, discussing need for
the U.S. to indemnify U.S. launch companies so that they can be competitive with
Arianespace, whose launches were indemnified by the French government); see
also id. (statement of Patricia A. Mahoney, Chair, Satellite Industry Association).
221 Hearings, supra note 57 (statement of Patricia A. Mahoney, Chair, Satellite
Industry Association).
222 See e.g., Collins, supra note 18.
223 Id.
224 Rogers, supra note 46, at 38-39.
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tion.2 2 5 One obvious explanation is that these companies are
not yet in a position, technologically, to proceed with their ap-
plications. However, it also stands to reason that a more stream-
lined system of requirements would facilitate the licensing
process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Commercial space travel should not be relegated to the realm
of science fiction. With enormous market potential and rapidly
growing private interest, space tourism and the RLV industry
could soon be very real. Unfortunately, the current regulatory
regime places serious burdens on the industry. The realistic and
accommodating framework embodied by the Warsaw Conven-
tion was crucial to the growth of the aviation industry and pro-
vides much-needed guidance. RLV regulation must be
reformed to resemble the aviation regime if the commercial
space travel industry is to ever make it off the launch pad.
225 Rosenberg, supra note 106.
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